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China's monetary sterilization and it's economical relationship 
with the European Union 
  Tamás Gábor 
The author examines China’s monetary policy in the light of the sterilization process of the 
excess liquidity caused by the permanent foreign exchange rate intervention. The tools of the 
neutralization of the monetary oversupply, its effectiveness and its costs are also investigated. 
With the help of Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression method it is demonstrated that the 
sterilization process of the yuan has been almost a total success on the level of the monetary 
base, and has been partially effective on the level of the M2 supply in the past 15 years. With a 
cost-benefit analysis it is highlighted that the practice of the monetary sterilization – which is 
thought to be loss-making in the literature – has been a profitable operation of the central bank 
up to date. 
After the demonstration of the monetary sterilization, the economic relationship between China 
and the European Union is investigated. It is pointed out that China’s role as a global importer 
and a global investor has been significantly appreciated. Thanks to China’s active economic 
presence in the European market during the crisis, the recession of the European economies 
were probably much moderate. 
Keywords: China monetary sterilization, 2SLS, European Union, crisis 
1. Introduction 
The continuous managing of the exchange rate of the Chinese currency puts serious challenges to 
China’s central bank, The People’s Bank of China (hereinafter referred to as PBC), on a daily basis. In 
the last three years – presupposing 250 trading days per year – it has daily purchased 1.9 billion USD 
for yuan in the Shanghai foreign exchange market, and as a result, it has doubled its reserves since the 
beginning of 2008.1 Given that one of the focal points of social tensions has always been the mass 
impoverishment caused by inflation, the Chinese party leadership takes fighting against inflation 
extremely seriously. In the light of this, the monetary policy gives high priority to neutralizing the 
monetary oversupply. 
In foreign exchange purchase, the central bank chooses between the options of purchasing at the 
expense of increase in the monetary base and financing the purchase by decreasing the net domestic 
assets. The latter is made possible by the sale of available government bonds, the auction of bonds and 
swap and repo operations. However, the monetary authority is able to sterilize the liquidity increasing 
effect of foreign exchange inflows not exclusively on the level of the monetary base. Raising the 
required reserve ratio through the multiplier effect is also able to reduce the supply of broader 
monetary aggregates. 
                                                     
1
 At the closure of the study, 30th June 2011, the PBC foreign exchange reserves increased by 30.3%, to 3197 
billion USD in one year. It equals approximately to six hundred thousand billion in HUF! 
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Figure 1: The components of China’s balance of payments, the tendency of foreign exchange 
reserves and yuan exchange rate, 1990-2010, in million USD 
 
Source: CEIC (2011), SAFE 
China’s economic policy has indeed become the focus of international research after joining the World 
Trade Organization in 2001. Just at the time when the growth in the central bank reserves started to 
accelerate (Figure 1). The Chinese reserves have been impetuously increasing as a result of the twin 
balance of payment surplus2 ever since. A considerable part of the increase is caused by the current 
account sufficit, which has an amount only of 12 billion USD in 1990 and 426 billion USD in 2008.3 
In the past years, however, the net capital inflow has been playing an increasingly important role 
within the balance of payment sufficit. Last year the 226 billion surplus of the capital account was the 
highest value of all time! Knowing all this, a double cause can be identified underlying China’s unique 
reserve growth dynamics. On the one hand, it can be explained by the objectives of the Chinese 
economic policy pursuing a strictly managed exchange rate policy and supporting de facto export. 
Many analysts claim that for maintaining competitiveness China fixes the exchange rate of its 
currency undervalued by 30-40%4 against USD.5 The weak yuan is advantageous both for the export 
sector and for the investments of multinational companies in China. The former increases the current 
account sufficit, the latter the capital account sufficit. 
On the other hand, we emphasize the speculative demand aimed at the future strengthening the 
Chinese currency. The one-way bet of short-term profit oriented investors on exchange rate 
strengthening is able to move huge amount of foreign exchange. Since the hot money can be 
extremely harmful concerning an emerging economy, China’s decision makers try to prevent this type 
                                                     
2
 Gábor’s (2010a) article contains a detailed analysis on the causes behind China’s irregular twin balance of 
payment surplus and the development of twin sufficit. 
3
 If we examine the components of the current account, we can see that the trade sufficit – including the export 
of goods in particular – is responsible for the most part, 77% of the sufficit. 
4
 These views are represented mainly by the noted economists of the American Peterson Institute for Economics 
(Bergsten, 2010; Cline et al., 2009; Goldstein et al., 2006), and by Paul Krugman, who was the recipient of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 2008. 
5
 I make a note here that there are experts who consider the nature of the global financial tensions different. The 
economists of the global monetarist view, McKinnon and Schnabl (2011) claim that the international 
disequilibrium is only a temporary state. They think that in the case of the rising Asian economies the fixed 
exchange rate is “needed” for the stabilization of the Asian region. 
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of capital flow with strict capital and administrative requirements.6 Despite all this, in the past nearly 
one decade there has been increasing volatility in the short-term capital flows (capital account) and on 
the net errors and omissions account of the balance of payment, which implies the limit of the 
efficiency of capital controls. Without foreign exchange market intervention, the intensive capital 
inflow would result in the uncontrollable strengthening of the USD exchange rate of the yuan, which 
would be incompatible with the objectives of China’s mercantilist trading policy. The regular foreign 
exchange purchase, however, would induce intense increase in money supply and in inflation (real 
exchange rate appreciation), which would make the realization of the previously mentioned objective 
and the plan to put an end to poverty uncertain. Maintaining the status quo necessitates the immediate 
neutralization, sterilization of the liquidity increasing effect of foreign exchange purchase. 
We intend to describe as follows the sterilization techniques applied by the PBC through examining 
the items of the central bank balance sheet. 
Table 1: Schematic balance of payments of the People’s Bank of China 
Assets Sources 
Foreign assets 
Monetary base (cash in circulation + deposits of 
commercial banks) 
Claims on government Deposits of government 
Claims on depository corporations Foreign liabilities 
Claims on and other financial and non-financial 
corporations  
Issued bonds  
Equity capital 
Other assets Other liabilities 
Note: Net foreign assets = Foreign assets – foreign liabilities 
Net domestic assets = Claims on financial and other financial and non-financial institutions + Claims 
on government + Other assets – Issued bonds – Deposits of government – Other liabilities = 
Monetary base – Net foreign assets + Equity capital of central bank 
Table 1 demonstrates the simplified form of the PBC balance. The net domestic assets (hereinafter 
referred to as NDA) and the net foreign assets (hereinafter referred to as NFA) can be easily calculated. 
Based on this, the basic equation of the central bank’s balance of payment can be formulated, 
according to which the sum of the net foreign and the net domestic assets is equal to the sum of the 
monetary base and the equity capital.7 If the NFA, i.e. approximately the central bank reserve 
increases, it results in increase in the monetary base for lack of open market sterilization. 
                                                     
6
 The active control of the arbitrage capital is needed in order to avoid the damage in the monetary independence 
of the central bank beside the strictly managed exchange rate regime. The “impossible trinity” of economic 
policy, which is frequently referred to as monetary trilemma by the literature, does not allow the simultaneous 
realization of monetary independence, fixed exchange rates and international capital flows. Consequently, the 
problem and the conflict of the simultaneous realization of internal economic and external economic objectives, 
that is the objectives of inflation and exchange rate, emerge (Triffin dilemma). Since for China both objectives 
have similarly high priority, the controlling authorities have a very considerable role in the “coordination” of the 
processes of “social market economy” – from bank lending to controlling factor prices. 
7
 Since the PBC equity capital – which has had an unchanged value since 2003 – has a negligible amount in the 
ratio of the balance sheet total (21.9 billion yuan ~ 3.3 billion USD), we disregard this balance sheet item in our 
calculations. 
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Provided the central bank intends to stem the growth in monetary supply, it can do so by decreasing 
the net domestic assets and by raising the required reserve ratio. According to the quarterly published 
Monetary Report, the two main sterilization tools of the PBC are the open market operation and the 
control of required reserve ratio, both having different effects on money supply. Table 2 shows the 
effect mechanism of the two methods. 
Table 2: Sterilization tools 
Method Process 
Open market operations (issuing bonds 
and repos) 
1. NFA increases by ΔNFA 
2. MB = NFA + NDA increases by ΔNFA 
3. NDA decreases by ΔNDA, MB returns to original level  
4. M2= MB * mm constant 
Raising the required reserve ratio  
1. NFA increases by ΔNFA 
2. MB increases  
3. mm decreases through raising required reserve ratio  
4. M2= MB * mm constant 
Note: mm is the abbreviation of monetary multiplier, MB stands for monetary base. 
While by the open market operation, excess liquidity can be directly withdrawn from the market, 
raising the required reserve ratio can reduce oversupply through decreasing the money market 
multiplier. It can be generally established that the sterilization with required reserves is a cheaper 
solution for the monetary authority, since it entails considerably lower interest burden than market 
rates.8 
The most frequently applied open market sterilization techniques are the bond issue and the short-term 
– mainly 91-day – security repurchasing, so-called repo transactions.9 The third tool of sterilization is 
the window guidance (moral suasion). This latter practically means verbal intervention, in which the 
central bank forces that the operation of commercial banks and through them the monetary supply 
should develop by keeping the nation’s interest in view (e.g. it sets the credit ceilings). Since the 
quantification of the latter method is quite problematic, it is not incorporated in our study. 
The neutralization of the monetary oversupply was implemented through selling the government 
bonds of the central bank until 2002. However, due to the shortage of bonds, the central bank has been 
sterilizing excess liquidity by issuing own bonds (central bank bill, CBB) since 2003. The first issue 
took place in April 2003, since then bond auctions have been held on a weekly basis. 
The three-month and the one-year bills are the bonds of the most frequent maturity, but six-month 
bonds were auctioned on several occasions before 2006, while bonds of three-year maturity are 
periodically issued.10 The sterilization bonds of financial institutions expanded to 4.800 billion yuan in 
                                                     
8
 The increase in required reserve ratio is an implicit taxation form, which increases the interest margin between 
deposits and credits through the decreasing profitability of the bank sector and has a reducing effect on 
competition. Árvai’s (1995) work deals with the welfare loss and controlling role of the reserve ratio increase in 
greater detail. 
9
 The central bank of China has also been trying to stem the monetary oversupply with swap operations since 
2005. However, we do not have related data series, since the PBC does not make the details of swap transactions 
public. 
10
 From April 2010 until the end of the year, due to the concerns over the increasing inflation, bonds of 3-year 
maturity for more than a thousand billion yuan were issued for eight months. 
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five years – by October 2008 –, then it lessened to 3.500 billion yuan by the beginning of 2011. The 
shrinking of open market operations is reinforced by the fact that the proportion of bonds to the central 
bank reserves has considerably decreased, from 40% to 18% in the past four years (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Open market sterilization of PBC, 2002-2010 
 
Source: CEIC (2011), China Monetary Policy Report 
Although the regular rise of the required reserve ratio has significant distorting effect on markets11, 
China’s monetary authority still employs this practice with growing regularity after the second half of 
2000s in order to control monetary supply. Until the closure of the article, July 2011, the central bank 
raised the reserve rate required after deposits to 21.5% (Figure 3). Despite the fact that the gradual 
increase in required reserves already began in 2003, the total reserve ratio – which contains the excess 
reserve besides the required – decreased from 2006 12.3% to 10.6% until the mid of 2006! This could 
be realized by that commercial banks rearranged the required deposits charged on the excess reserves. 
In the light of this, the sterilization function of raising the required reserve ratio remained ineffective 
up until the first half of 2006.12 
The initial high level of excess reserves can be traced back to a double cause. On the one hand, due to 
strict capital controls and the immature and not prudent financial intermediary system the central bank 
deposits did not have a serious alternative. On the other hand, the PBC paid an equal, 1.89% interest 
payments on both the required and the excess reserves. 
In the course of our research we aimed to examine the effectiveness of monetary sterilization13 with 
regression-analysis of the changes of central bank’s balance sheet data and the macroindicators on the 
                                                     
11
 The rising countries – e.g. Malaysia, Korea, the Republic of the Philippines – regularly took the advantage of 
the reserve ratio increase in order to neutralize the increasing monetary oversupply caused by intensive capital 
inflow in the 1990s (Takagi and Esaka, 1999). 
12
 The reduction of the initial high level of the excess reserves lowered the decreasing effect of the increasing 
reserve ratio on the money multiplier until the first half of 2006. According to our calculations, the average 4.6 
value of the M2 multiplier between September 2003 and June 2006 did not decrease despite of the 1.5% increase 
of the required reserve ratio. In our opinion, these changes can be explained not only by the rearrangement 
between the excess-required reserves but also by the institutional changes, occurring in currency holdings. 
13
 In the quantification of the effectiveness of monetary sterilization, we started out from the MB=NDA+NFA 
equation. We examine the extent of the net domestic assets decrease that follows the net foreign assets (foreign 
exchange reserves) increase. Performing a similar analysis between the monetary base and the NFA would be 
problematic because, on the one hand, the PBC does not publish the distribution of required and excess reserves 
within the central bank deposits, on the other hand, with the change of economic cycles other changes which 
China's monetary sterilization and it's economical relationship with the European Union 
361 
level of monetary base and M2 supply, furthermore, to quantify the costs of the sterilization practice. 
After outlining the literature studying the effectiveness of sterilization, we describe the methodology 
we have chosen and the processed data series. In the next stage – relying on the estimated parameters 
of the regression model – we draw inferences about the effectiveness of neutralizing the Chinese 
monetary oversupply. Finally, we examine by comparing the sterilization costs and the yields earned 
on foreign assets that what costs today’s practice of exchange rate policy imposes on monetary policy, 
furthermore, we make assumptions in connection with the sustainability of the current practice. 
Figure 3:The amount of money neutralized in monetary sterilization, tendency of reserves and 
required reserve ratio, 2003–2011, billion yuan 
 
Source: CEIC (2011) 
2. Methodology 
Many studies deal with the central bank reaction to foreign capital inflow, and its effect on the 
monetary and economic environment. In the past two decades, the number of researches which focus 
on the monetary reaction function of the Asian countries, especially of China, has been multiplied. 
One of the most popular methods of examining the relationship between the NFA and NDA is the 
regression analysis. This method is built on the estimations of the linear regression of two structural 
equations, in which the subject of study is what kind of effects the independent variables involved in 
the model have on the examined dependent variable, i.e. to what extent they can predict it. The 
regression equation is the following in general: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖2+. . . +𝛽𝑚 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑚 + 𝜖𝑖 (1) 
 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑛 and 𝑚 + 1 < 𝑛 < 𝑁 
,where 𝑦𝑖 is the dependent variable of the model, 𝑥𝑖 is the independent vectors, 𝛽𝑚 is the coefficients 
of the explanatory variables, and 𝜖𝑖 is the random error of the model. The coefficient of the NFA is the 
sterilization coefficient, which shows the extent and direction of change that the unit increase of 
foreign exchange reserves causes in the net domestic assets of the central bank. If its value is -1, it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
cannot be related to sterilization may also occur in the required reserve deposits, which would distort the 
outcome of the analysis. 
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means the total neutralization of excess liquidity, 0 means the total absence of sterilization. The other 
named coefficient is the offset coefficient, which indicates how the foreign capital flow reacts to the 
changes of the domestic monetary environment. The -1 value of the coefficient refers to perfect capital 
mobility, while the value 0 refers to total capital control. 
Aizenman and Glick (2009) featured the quarterly GDP change as control variable in their model, in 
which it received -0.6 and -1.4 values for the sterilization coefficient. Wang (2009) also ignored the 
phenomenon of endogeneity emerging between the net capital flow and the net domestic assets in his 
analysis. In the course of analysis, he received a value of -0.3 for the offset coefficient, and -0.96 for 
the sterilization coefficient. 
The basis of the regression is the method of ordinary least square, hereinafter OLS, whose condition is 
that the model is homoscedastic and autocorrelation and multicollinearity do not emerge in the model. 
The estimation with OLS is problematic because it does not take into account the fact that the net 
capital flown has a simultaneous effect on the net domestic assets of the central bank, and this latter 
has repercussion on the a foreign exchange flow. Since the dependent variables are defined in an 
exogenous way, the method of ordinary least square does not render it possible to examine the 
interaction effects. Due to the problems the applicability of the OLS entails other regression 
techniques may come into prominence (Brissimis et al., 2002; Kim, 2003; Ouyang et al., 2010; Wang, 
2009). For instance, the 2SLS, i.e. the two-stage least squares method14, which examines the effect of 
independent variables on dependent variables by simultaneous structural equations, in addition to 
eliminating the problem of endogeneity. This technique is used when the random errors of the 
dependent variable correlate with the explanatory variables. The basis for applying the 2SLS may be 
that one explanatory variable (NFA) correlates with the random error (𝑢), thus the estimation of the 
regression coefficient (𝛽1) will be distorted. 
 Δ𝑁𝐷𝐴 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢 (2) 
In the first step, the variable considered endogenous (NFA) is regressed on the instrumental15 variable 
or variables (𝑧): 
 Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗ = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑧 + 𝑣 (3) 
In the second step, the equation is formulated with using the value predicated in the equation (3) 
(ΔNFA*) instead of the endogenous variable (ΔNFA): 
 Δ𝑁𝐷𝐴 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗ +𝑢 (4) 
The greatest challenge of the 2SLS method is to select the instrumental variables correctly, which 
allows us to take account the simultaneous interactions of the changes of the NDA and NFA. Ouyang 
et al (2010) used government expenditures as the instrument of the NDA, while real effective 
exchange rate as the instrument of the NFA. The 𝛽 sterilization coefficient takes on value -1.02 in his 
model in the period of 2000–2008, which implicates total neutralization of excess liquidity. Our 
assumption that government expenditures do not have a direct effect on foreign capital inflow is 
questionable. Taking this into consideration, the unbiased of the estimation can also be queried. The 
                                                     
14
 In our research, we calculated with the help of LeSage’s (1999) JPL Econometrics Toolbox in Matlab: 
http://www.spatial-econometrics.com/ 
15
 Instrumental variable (z) is the variable which does not correlate with the random error of the original 
regression equation (u), [Cov(z,u) = 0] at the same time it correlates with the variable (ΔNFA) which correlates 
with u according to the assumption, that is: [Cov(z, ΔNFA) ≠ 0] 
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fiscal expansion produces yield decrease on the government securities market, which certainly has an 
effect on the direction and intensity of the capital flow. Kim (2003) also claimed that the high budget 
deficit has a negative effect on international capital inflow. 
Zhang (2010) chose the volatility of exchange rate as the instrumental variable of the NFA, while in 
the case of the NDA he selected a dummy variable16. Nevertheless, no coefficients of the instruments 
had significant explanatory force; in addition, the coefficient of the dummy variable took on a sign 
contrary to his expectations. 
In our research we chose the 2SLS method as the analytical framework, in the course of which we 
modified the set of regressor and instrumental variables used in the literature, in this way we tried to 
estimate the effectiveness of sterilization on a more robust manner. We aimed to select such indicators 
as predictive variables in the model that, on the one hand, have an effect on the movement of foreign 
capital flow, on the other hand, have decisive momentum in the decisions of the monetary policy. In 
addition to the explanatory variables applied in the literature (Brissimis et al., 2002; Kim, 2003; 
Ouyang et al., 2010) we also used regressors that in our opinion increase the predictive capability of 
the estimation. 
We chose the 12-month volatility of the yuan exchange rate and the quarterly change of the Shenzhen 
Composite Index as instrumental variable. The volatility of the exchange rate is exogenous with regard 
to the changes of the net domestic assets, while it moves together with the net foreign assets in a 
slightly positive direction. Furthermore, while no correlation can be shown between the indicator of 
the stock index and the foreign exchange, the stock index moves in the opposite direction to the 
change of the net domestic assets. 
We describe in this chapter how the particular control variables are able to grasp the movers of capital 
flows and the direction of monetary policy. 
The literature concerned with the Chinese sterilization generally points out that the neutralization of 
monetary oversupply by authorities started after 2000. In the course of our analysis, however, for the 
better interpretability of the explanatory force of the estimated coefficients we processed the data of a 
longer period. Since the shortest breakdown of the GDP data published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China is a quarter, in our analysis we built the model on the quarterly data of the period 
between 1995Q3 and 2010Q417. The CEIC (2011) China Premium Database, the PBC and the BIS 
website served as the source of the input data series. Table 3 contains the short definition, formula and 
sources of the variables. 
                                                     
16
 The dummy variable took on value 1 in every fourth quarter, while 0 in the rest. Zhang (2010) started out from 
the purchasing habits of the Chinese. As the new year comes, the commercial banks increase their reserves for 
greater liquidity. His basic assumption is that the arrival of the new year does not have any kind of effect on 
foreign capital flow. 
17
 The input data set consists of 62 columns. It satisfies the quantity criteria necessary for the regression 
calculation, but the values of the coefficients have to be interpreted with proper caution. It would have been 
more practical to start out from monthly data, but the required monthly GDP was not available. 
Crisis Aftermath: Economic policy changes in the EU and its Member States 
364 
Table 3: Description, formula and source of the used explanatory variables 
Variable Description Mode of calculation Source 
NFAt 
Forex reserves of PBC in USD minus central 
bank foreign liabilities 
Foreign assetst * et
(RMB/$)
 – Foreign 
liabilitiest 
IFS 
∆NFA*t 
The extent of change in the assets of NFA, 
corrected by the yield on foreign assets and 
exchange rate effects; in the ratio of GDP  
 {𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 − ( 
𝑒𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡−1
𝑒𝑡−1
 ) 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1 −
𝑖 
  (
𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
2  )
}
 𝐷𝑃𝑡
 PBC, 
CEIC 
∆NDA*t 
The extent of change in the assets of NDA in 
the ratio of GDP 
 𝑀𝐵𝑡
 𝐷𝑃𝑡
−  𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡
∗  CEIC 
mmt M2 money market multiplier M2t / MB CEIC 
∆mmt Change of multiplier  Ln (mmt) – Ln (mmt-1) CEIC 
∆RRt Change of required reserve rate  Ln(RRt) – Ln(RRt-1) CEIC 
∆CPIt Delayed change of consumer price index  Ln(CPIt) – Ln(CPIt-1) CEIC 
∆NEXt Change of net export in the ratio of GDP 
(𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡 −𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡−1)
 𝐷𝑃𝑡
 
CEIC, 
IFS 
∆Gt-1 
Change of government expenditures in the 
ratio of GDP 
 𝑡−1 −  𝑡−2
 𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
 CEIC 
∆SZSEt 
Change of the Shenzhen Composite Index in 
value 
Ln(SZSEt) – Ln(SZSEt-1) CEIC 
∆REERt Change of real effective exchange rate Ln(REERt) – Ln (REERt-1) BIS 
∆R$t 
Change in three-month yields of the American 
money market  
Ln(i$t) – Ln(i$t-1) CEIC 
yct 
Cyclical GDP. Deviation from the quarterly 
GDP trend (HP trend)  
 𝐷𝑃𝑡 −  𝐷𝑃𝑡
 
 𝐷𝑃 
 CEIC 
vol_exc
h t-12,t 
Volatility of USD exchange rate of yuan  
∑ (𝑒𝑡−𝑖 − 𝑒𝑡−12,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
212
𝑖=0
12
 PBC 
 
We examined the change of the NFA, NDA, NEX and G in the ratio of the GDP produced in the given 
period, while the majority of the other variables were defined in logarithm. We used Hodrick–Prescott 
filter18 to determine the long-term trend of the real GDP, with the help of which we calculated the 
cyclical GDP. 
For defining the net foreign assets of the monetary authority, similarly to the literature, we did not start 
out from the data of the foreign assets in the central bank balance sheet, but we based on the values of 
the foreign exchange reserves published by the IMF IFS. Furthermore, we took account of those kinds 
of changes of the NFA which cannot be related to the in- and outflow of the foreign capital. Adapted 
from Aizenman et al. (2008) we filtered out the changes of foreign exchange reserves produced by 
exchange rate revaluation according to the following: 𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑡−1(
𝑒𝑡−𝑒𝑡−1
𝑒𝑡−1
), where 𝑒𝑡 is the nominal 
exchange rate of yuan-USD at period 𝑡. 19 In addition, we corrected the NFA by the yield earned on the 
central bank’s foreign investments. In the course of calculation, for the sake of simplification we 
assumed that the foreign exchange reserve was in its entirety put in a 10-year American government 
                                                     
18
 The HP filter is a popular smoothing technique in the econometric toolbox. It gives the estimation of the long-
term trend component of a time series. For smoothing we used λ=1600. 
19
 Since the PBC does not publish public data regarding the composition of the foreign exchange reserves, it is 
not possible to exactly filter out the exchange rate effects. The literature estimates that the dominant part of the 
reserves – more than 70% – is USD-based, thus we made a simplification in our calculations by considering the 
total reserves as based on USD assets. 
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bond investment.20 The quarterly yield was calculated as the product of the value of the average NFA 
and the value of the American government bond yield projected to quarter. 
The value of the corrected NFA* was calculated with the following formula: 
 Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴 ∗=
Δ{𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−(
𝑒𝑡−𝑒𝑡−1
𝑒𝑡−1
)𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1− 
𝑖 
4
(
𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡+𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
2
)}
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
 (5) 
The ∆NDA asset is the difference of the change of the monetary base and the changes of the net 
foreign assets. 
Our equations are the following: 
 Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Δ𝑁𝐷𝐴 + 𝛼2Δ𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼3Δ𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼4Δ𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼5Δ𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼6Δ 𝑡 +
𝛼7Δ𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼8Δ𝑅 𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑦𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑣𝑜𝑙_𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−12,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 (6) 
 Δ𝑁𝐷𝐴 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴 + 𝛽2Δ𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽3Δ𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4Δ𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5Δ𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑡 + β6Δ 𝑡 +
𝛽7Δ𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽8ΔR t + 𝛽9𝑦𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽10Δ𝑆𝑍𝑆𝐸𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 (7) 
,where 𝛥𝑚𝑚 is the M2 money market multiplier, ΔRR is the required reserve ratio, 𝛥𝐶𝑃𝐼 is the 
consumer price index, 𝛥𝑁𝐸𝑋 is the net export,    is the government expenditures, 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 is the yuan 
real effective exchange rate, 𝛥𝑅  is the change of the three-month American money market interest 
rate, and 𝑦𝑐 is the cyclical GDP. The instrumental variables are the 𝑣𝑜𝑙_𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ, the 12-month volatility 
of the yuan exchange rate, and the 𝛥𝑆𝑍𝑆𝐸, which shows the change of the composite index of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
In the case of the 𝛽1 sterilization coefficient we expect a negative value, since the neutralization of the 
excess liquidity generated by capital inflow by open market operations has a reducing effect on the 
central bank’s net domestic assets. According to Ouyang et al. (2010), an offset coefficient near 0 and 
a sterilization coefficient near -1-hez indicate the higher independence of the monetary policy. 
In the case of the money market multiplier’s 𝑎2 coefficient, a minus sign is probable. The increasing 
multiplier indicates expansive economic policy and decreasing required reserve rate, which can result 
in capital outflow through the lower yield levels. In the case of 𝛽2 the situation is less unequivocal. 
The effect of the multiplier on the net domestic assets depends on whether the monetary restriction is 
implemented by open market operations or by raising the required reserve ratio. In the case of the 
former, the 𝛽2 takes on a minus sign, i.e. the NDA decrease, while in the latter case the NDA may as 
well increase (cf. Table 2 above). In addition, the accelerating increase in the money supply may 
generate the introduction of bank credit ceilings and stricter capital controls, which may result in the 
move of the 𝛽2 in negative direction. 
Raising the required reserve ratio brings about the increase in interest surcharge on one side, which 
motivates the inflow of foreign capital, and it increases the monetary base on the other side. We expect 
the coefficients of the RR – 𝛼3 and 𝛽3 – to be slightly positive. 
The danger of the runaway of inflation has been hanging over the head of the central bank like the 
sword of Damocles for decades. Therefore the monetary authority uses all possible means to stop 
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 This assumption does not stand far from reality, because according to the annual statement published by the 
American Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the total value of the American investment possessed by China was 1611 
thousand billion USD on 30 June 2010, the 92% of which was deposited in long-term assets. 
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inflation. Consequently, the coefficient (𝛼4) is probable to have a minus sign in the case of equation 
(6), since the fear of devaluation and capital loss usually urges the foreign investors to withdraw 
capital. The question in both cases is that how large is the time frame between the inflation and the 
economic-political and investor reactions it produces. 
While in the case of increase in net export, thus in the export income the rise of NFA can be 
prognosticated, its effect on the NDA is not unequivocal. However, taking account of China’s export-
oriented economic policy, the excessive increase in export as one of the signs of economic exaltation 
may as well generate restriction measures on the part of economic policy. 
Due to the government’s overspending the risk premium of the country will probably increase, which 
results in a rising yield environment. In the light of higher yields, an increasing proportion of 
commercial bank sources are deposited in the central bank, which induces the shrinkage of the net 
domestic assets (negative 𝛽6 coefficient). Although the increasing yields induce capital inflow on the 
other side, the deterioration of country risk – which results in outflow – is a much more powerful 
factor in making investment decisions. Consequently, we expect a decrease in the case of the foreign 
exchange assets (NFA) as well.21 
According to our assumptions, the effect of the real effective exchange rate on the central bank 
reserves can be two-directional. On one side, the strengthening of the exchange rate can bring about 
the decrease in foreign exchange reserves through the deteriorating current account, while on the other 
side, in the light of the intensifying expectations of exchange rate appreciation22 – and with the 
acceleration of the hot money inflow – it can bring about increase in reserves. Since the appreciation 
of a country’s foreign exchange rate can be counteracted by economic expansion, i.e. by the expansion 
of domestic money supply, we expect plus sign in the case of the 𝛽8. 
The effect of foreign (dollar) yield increase can be estimated in the knowledge of uncovered interest 
parity conditions. The more advantageous foreign investment possibilities created by rising American 
interest rates result in capital outflow,23 i.e. it probably has a reducing effect on the NFA. The central 
bank can respond to it with interest rate increase and monetary restrictions, which may result in the 
reduction of the NDA. 
The effect of the cyclical income24 on central bank reserves – similarly to the real exchange rate – can 
be dual. The real GDP growth caused by economic boom impairs the current account balance through 
the income effect, which may lead to the reduction of capital inflow. At the same time, the real 
economic expansion can increase the investors’ trust in the Chinese economy, which can motivate 
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 However, it also can occur that the increase of both the foreign exchange assets and the central bank’s source 
side happen simultaneously as a consequence of the increasing financial demand of the state, e.g. in the case of 
government currency credit. 
22
 The offshore forward exchange rate of the yuan (NDF, non-deliverable forward) showed a significant 
premium in contrast to the spot exchange rate in the slipping revaluation periods as well. This means that the 
revaluation tension does not decline in the course of the revaluation process. 
23
 Instead of the American money market yields, it could have been justified to present the spread of the Chinese 
– American yields as explanatory variables in the model. However, it was not practical for two reasons. On the 
one hand, the role of the Chinese monetary policy is still authoritative in the development of domestic interest 
levels through defining the directive deposit and credit interest rates. On the other hand, the strict administrative 
capital controls in force reduce the latitude of the free flow of arbitrage capital, which limits the fulfillment of 
the interest parity conditions. As a consequence of these two factors, the comparison of the Chinese yields with 
the American yields can be problematic. Wang (2009) points out that the coefficient of the interest rate spread is 
often not significant or takes on wrong direction in the regression. 
24
 Cyclical income means the positive or negative deviation from the long-term trend of the economic growth. 
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capital inflow. The economic prosperity generally results in restrictive measures on the part of the 
monetary policy, thus a negative coefficient is expected in the other case. 
3. Empirical results 
We checked the stationarity of variables with Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In order to 
decrease the unit-root problem, we examined the first-degree differentials – i.e. the changes of the 
value between t and t-1 period – for the majority of the vectors in the model. We employed delay in 
certain cases in order to reduce the autocorrelation of random errors and to increase the explanatory 
force of the model. The delay of the particular explanatory variables was received as a result of an 
optimization procedure. We carried the optimization out in MATLAB (LaSage, 1999). We examined 
the effect and significance level of the coefficients of all the eight exogenous variables from zero 
retroactively to three-period delay. We chose the size of delays by model from the 48=65536 possible 
combinations in a way that in addition to minimizing the occasional autocorrelation problem (Durbin-
Watson taking on 2 near values), we have the best possible explanatory force (𝑅2 should be larger than 
70%), and the most significant coefficients (significance level should reach value 1%, 5% or 10%). 
Thus we got the following delays: delays employed in the case of NFA equation: NEX: -2 period; CPI 
and yct: -1 period. In the case of NDA equation REER, RR, CPI and yct: -1 period; while NEX: -3 
period. 
The explanatory force of both equations is well above the threshold of 70% suggested for economic 
modeling. While in the 6th equation the R2 takes on 0.875, it takes on 0.962 in the 7th equation.25 
Accordingly, the exogenous variable set predicts the change of the NFA and NDA assets in 87.5% and 
96.3% respectively. For testing the autocorrelation we relied on the output of the Durbin-Watson test26. 
In the case of the ∆NFA regression the value of DW is 1.69, for the ∆NDA it is 1.92. Accordingly, the 
autocorrelation is negligible in the case of the former and it can be completely ruled out for the latter. 
Table 4 contains the beta (𝛼, 𝛽) coefficients received in the course of regression, their standard errors 
and the applied delays. The 𝛽1 sterilization coefficient is significant and takes on a value of -0.945, 
which shows a very high degree of neutralization of the monetary oversupply during the examined 
period. Our received estimation is nearly identical to the similar types of results in the literature. 
However, our offset coefficient, whose value is -0.897 by a significance level of 1%, considerably 
differs from the numbers of similar studies. While Wang (2009) received a value of -0.3022 for the 
coefficient quantifying the flexibility of capital flow as well, Zhang (2010) received a value of -0.65, 
and Ouyang et al. (2010) received values between -0.63 and -0.71. The offset coefficient near -1 
means the fast and flexible reaction of the foreign capital to the changes occurring in China’s monetary 
environment. The difference presumably originates from that the model we examine processes a 
longer period, lasting until the end of 2010. The smaller coefficient can mean the mitigation of the 
presence of the state’s strict regulators, the approvers of transactions, which can be partly 
acknowledged in the light of the new priorities of the Chinese monetary policy following the crisis.27 
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 R
2
 is the multiple determination coefficient, which shows the explanatory force of the model. It indicates the 
strength of the relationship in relation to the extent in which the independent variables predict the dependent 
variable. 
26
 With the help of the Durbin-Watson test we can test the primary autocorrelation of the residuals. In the case of 
autocorrelation, the assumption that the observations are independent injures. 
27
 After the global economic crisis, from the summer of 2010, China’s monetary authority placed the 
continuation of financial integration in the focus. The official and unofficial statements of the central bank’s 
decision makers all reveal that the medium-term aim is the realization of the total convertibility of the yuan, i.e. 
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However, the extent of the negative difference of our offset coefficient from the similar values of the 
literature cannot be entirely explained by the changes in the objectives of the monetary policy. 
According to our assumptions, the speculations related to the one way bet on the currency revaluation 
may account for the greater capital mobility. Goodfriend and Prasad (2006) pointed out that the 
efficiency of the Chinese capital controls erodes in the course of time as the domestic and international 
investors find the channels with which the barriers become evaded.28 
Table 4: The estimated coefficient parameters of the 2SLS model 
 
Note: A (*),(**),(***) are the signs of the 10%, 5% and 1%-os significance levels. 
Delays applied in the case of the 6th equation: NEX is 2, while the CPI and yct is 1 period. In the 7th 
equation it is 1 for the REER, RR, CPI and𝑦𝑐𝑡, while NEX is 3 periods.  
In addition to the high R-square, the applicability of our model is reinforced by that a considerable 
proportion of the coefficients received in the case of regressor variables is significant. By 10% 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the liberalization of the capital account in addition to the 1996 opening of the current account. In the light of the 
continually increasing inflation concerns, in summer 2010, after a 2-year break, China changed over again to the 
crawl-like exchange rate peg from the de facto fixed exchange regime. This may be the first step on the way to 
eliminate the restrictions on the capital account items. Gábor’s (2010b) article contains a more detailed 
description about the historical development of China’s capital controls. 
28
 The increase of a country’s trade openness increases the possibility that the capital evading the capital control 
flows in and out of the country through the items of the current account, for example by over- and undercharging 
(Prasad et al., 2005; Xie, 2006; Goldstein et al, 2008). Ma and McCauley (2008) pointed out, in addition to over- 
and undercharging, how both the foreign and the Chinese investors could evade the strict controls through the 
current incomes and current transfers in the past years. 
China's monetary sterilization and it's economical relationship with the European Union 
369 
significance level, the multiplier, the net export, the government expenditures, the USD yields and the 
cyclical GDP have a considerable effect in both cases (in addition, the required reserve rate in the 6th 
equation). 
The increase of the multiplier and the price level bring about the negative movement of the result 
variables as we assumed. In the case of inflation, we used one-period delay in both equations. It was 
needed because both the foreign investors and the central bank can react effectively to the changed 
inflation environment after one period passed. In addition, the change of price level has a much more 
direct effect on the net foreign assets.29 The coefficient of the required reserve ratio also met the 
expectations for the most part. The ΔRR has positive significant effect on the ΔNFA dependent 
variable – i.e. the increase of ΔRR causes ceteris paribus the increase of ΔNFA, which can be 
explained by the strengthening exchange rate expectations embodied through the rising yield levels. 
On the other side, however, the RR has a negligible effect on the central bank assets. 
A significant effect can also be observed in the examination of the effect of the cyclical income and the 
USD interest rates on the dependent variables. The increase of the American money market yields 
reduces the amount of the incoming capital on the one hand, and it results in restriction measures on 
the part of the central bank. 
In the case of the positive deviation of economic growth (𝑦𝑐𝑡) from the potential output, the booming 
import demand – and through it the deteriorating current account balance – generates decrease in 
foreign exchange reserves. The response of the economic policy to the increase of the output gap is 
also significant, since the overheating of the economy is followed by restriction measures. In both 
cases, the effect intensifies with the shift of a period. We consider that the cause of this “slip” in the 
latter case is that exact statistical data series which form the basis for economic planning and 
implementation are available for the decision makers only with a delay of some months. 
A similar delayed response-reaction can be observed in connection with the increase in net export 
income. The coefficient of NEX induces the mild positive change of foreign exchange reserves in the 
case of a two-period delay, while it causes the significant negative change of central bank assets by a 
three-period delay. We assume that the cause of the above shifted temporal reaction is that while the 
data series published by the IMF IFS and used in the model provide the registered trade transactions, 
the financial compensation of transactions is settled only at a later date. 
In the case of the increase in budget expenditures, we found that both the monetary policy and the 
investors respond with restriction and withdrawal of capital in the same period. This effect is 
significant in both cases, but it is considerably stronger regarding foreign exchange reserves. 
The change of real effective exchange rate has a positive effect on net domestic assets, as it was 
expected. The monetary authority responds to the excessive strengthening of the yuan real exchange 
rate with easing. However, its effect on foreign exchange reserves is dual. While the strengthening real 
exchange rate causes the decrease in foreign exchange reserves in the first period through the 
deteriorating current account, in the case of one-period delay it results in the increase in central bank 
reserves. Our opinion is that it may explained by the foreign investors’ slower reaction time and 
caution. 
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 We must note, however, that the inflation does not have a significant effect on the result variables! The result 
must be handled with proper caution. 
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3.1. Sterilization on the level of broad monetary supply 
The outlined methodology examined the effectiveness of sterilization in terms of the monetary base. 
Using a regression technique we established that the authorities neutralized nearly 94% of the liquidity 
increasing effect of foreign capital inflow on the level of the monetary base. 
Figure 4: Sterilization on the level of monetary base: the change of the NFA and NDA assets and 
the monthly growth of the monetary based on year, billion yuan 
 
Source: People’s Bank of China 
Figure 4 demonstrates the change of the NFA and NDA assets and the monthly growth of the monetary 
based on year. It can be observed that the monetary base shows an accelerating growth in the two years 
preceding the global financial crisis and since the beginning of 2010. In our opinion, this dynamics can 
be explained by the following factors. 
First of all, since the second half of 2006 the monetary authorities has put a greater emphasis on 
required reserve policy in order to stem the increase in monetary supply (M2). As a result, the required 
reserve ratio, standing on 7.5% for a long time, was doubled within less than two years. Since the rise 
of the reserve ratio entails the increase in the central bank deposits of commercial banks in certain 
cases, these changes may partly account for the growth of the monetary base.30 
Secondly, it seems that the role of the sterilization bond auctions has diminished recently. The total 
stock of sterilization bonds reached its culmination of 4.800 billion yuan in October 2008, which then 
decreased by more than 20% in two years. Figure 2 illustrates this weight shift, and it can be observed 
that the ratio of bonds to the central bank reserves exceeding 40% has been reduced to 18% by today! 
It may be explained by the objectives of interest policy. If the central bank systematically increases the 
required reserves ratio, it results in the desiccation of the interbank market liquidity and in the increase 
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 The rise of the reserve ratio increases the monetary base if the commercial banks produce the cover of 
additional capital demand by releasing central bank bonds or by selling foreign exchange. The rearrangement of 
the central bank’s excess deposits does not entail the increase in the monetary base. 
China's monetary sterilization and it's economical relationship with the European Union 
371 
of market yields.31 In order to avoid it, the PBC renews less expiring bonds parallel with raising the 
reserve ratio, thus the released sources produce the cover to fulfill the greater reserve expectations.32 
The third reason is to be searched in the credit expansion. The new credit amount, swelling 
explosively since the second half of the decade, would have caused monetary base increase even 
without the increase in required reserves. Although the global financial crisis has not affected China to 
the same extent as it affected the developed countries due to its unique economic system, the “credit 
taps” of commercial banks have been turned on even more intensively in order to ease the recession 
concerns caused by narrowing export markets and the sudden stop of global lending and at the same 
time to stimulate internal demand. The bank system produced twice as much new credit in 2009 (9.600 
billion yuan) and half as much again in 2010 (7.950 billion yuan) than in 2008. 
The fourth factor accounting for the monetary base growth is the change in the other liabilities of the 
monetary authority balance sheet since the second quarter of 2009.33 As the result of the sharply 
decreasing other liabilities, the net domestic assets (NDA) had increased by 1.100 billion yuan by 
December 2010 based on year (Figure 4). We think that the monetary base growth lasting since the end 
of 2010 can be mostly explained by this change. Since the PBC does not publish data regarding the 
composition of the other assets and liabilities, the causes underlying the fluctuation of the other 
liabilities cannot be established. 
In the light of the bias of the sterilization policy, it is not practical to examine the effectiveness of the 
excess liquidity neutralization merely on the level of the monetary base. With required reserve ratio 
and window guidance policy, the central bank is also able to moderate currency oversupply caused by 
foreign exchange inflow in the broader dimensions of monetary aggregates. In the case of the former, 
it can do so by decreasing the money market multiplier and in the latter by defining the credit 
contingents. Taking all this into consideration, we examined the factors forming the M2 monetary 
aggregate on the basis of the above described variable set with the help of a simple OLS model. 
Although the received explanatory force (R2= 47.6%) is not specifically strong compared to the values 
received in the case of the previous regressions, its output is still can be suitable to draw some 
conclusions with certain reservations. 
We involved the values of the estimated beta parameter in the M2 regression equation as well: 
 Δ𝑀2 = 0.180 ∗∗∗ +0.58 ∗∗ Δ𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 0.973 ∗∗∗ Δ𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 0.302 ∗∗ Δ𝑅𝑅𝑡 −
0.077Δ𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 + 0.053Δ 𝑡−1 + 0.053Δ𝑆𝑍𝑆𝐸𝑡 + 0.529Δ𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 − 0.153 ∗∗∗ Δ𝑅 𝑡 + 0.008𝑦𝑐𝑡 
  (8) 
The low explanatory force and the lower number of the significant variables can presumably be traced 
back to that the relationship between the M2 and the monetary base is not stable!34 The reason for this 
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 The uncontrolled increase in yield is a delicate area for the PBC because it further intensifies the already quite 
considerable revaluation pressure. 
32
 The bond auction was suspended two times in the first half of 2011 – in February and in June – by the PBC 
due to the excessive narrowing of the money supply caused by increasing required reserves ratio and to the rising 
yields. Source: Xinhua: China's central bank suspends bill issue, 23.06.2011. 
33
 The value of the net other assets increased between January 2001 and April 2005, then it had reached the 
lowest point of -2.010 billion yuan by April 2009 as a result of the greater increase – 2.600 billion yuan – of the 
other liabilities. In the next 15 months, however, the balance of the net other assets became positive again as a 
consequence of the drastic decline of the other liabilities. 
34
 The ratio of M2 and MB is considerably depends on the portfolio-allocation decisions of the real economic 
actors, on which central banks have only a limited influence. 
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can be partly that the central banks link their operative objectives to the development of monetary 
aggregates very rarely.35 
The M2-sterilization coefficient of the 𝛥𝑁𝐹𝐴 takes on a value of 0,584 by a significance level of 5%. 
Accordingly, the increase of 1 unit of the international foreign exchange reserves resulted in the 
increase of M2 by 0,58 unit, i.e. the central bank has sterilized only 42% of the foreign capital inflow 
successfully during the last 15-year period on the level of M2 supply. The multiplier and the American 
yield level coefficient took on the expected significant direction. In the case of the required reserve 
ratio, we received a negative value only in the second differential. The higher reserve requirements 
through the narrowing of the lending latitude of banks cause the reduction of M2 one period later. The 
inflation, the government expenditures, the stock index, the real effective exchange rate change and 
the cyclical income do not have significant effect, but they took on the expected direction according to 
the above description. 
As a summary, we found that the central bank has neutralized the rapid increase in the foreign 
exchange reserves which has been experienced in the past one and a half decades in nearly 94% in the 
case of the monetary base but only in 42% on the level of the M2. 
4. The costs of monetary sterilization 
The practice of economic policy outlined in the previous section and the maintenance of the strictly 
managed exchange rate regime entail serious costs. The increasing foreign exchange inflow in the past 
decade is responsible not only for the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, but also for that of 
the central bank sources serving the sterilization. The interest burden of these steps can be reduced by 
the income on the foreign assets, mostly on the American government bonds. 
The main components of the costs of monetary sterilization are the interest payments on outstanding 
bonds and on the central bank deposits deposited as required reserves. The short-term repo transaction 
has also appeared recently in the sterilization toolbox of the monetary policy, but we did not take its 
related costs into consideration due to its low proportion within open market operations. 
In what follows, we try to provide an answer to the question on how much explicit cost the 
neutralization of the monetary oversupply involves for the monetary authorities by estimating the 
direct costs36 of monetary sterilization and the yields earned on foreign exchange reserves. 
4.1. The interest burden of sterilization 
In the knowledge of the bond yields of different maturities and the composition of the stock, the 
interest payments on the sterilizations bonds can be calculated. The interbank market yields of the 3- 
and 6-month and the 1- and 3-year sterilization bonds (hereinafter referred to as CBB and central bank 
bond) have been available since September 2005 from the Bloomberg LP database. As we started the 
                                                     
35
 The ultimate aim of the PBC – similarly to most central banks – is to maintain the purchasing power of 
currency. 
36
 If we took account of the indirect costs which do not occur for the central bank as explicit expenditures, we 
would have to take account of the costs charged to the society by the banks due to the high reserve ratio, the 
exchange rate loss caused by revaluation and the cost of the higher inflation resulting from the exchange rate 
management. 
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time series analysis from April 2003, the first CBB bond auction, we calculated with the yields of the 
1-year Chinese government bonds in the case of the period lasting until September 2005.37 
It has been mentioned earlier that the PBC pays interest on both the required and the excess reserves. 
Since the level of interest payment was identical for both deposit types until 2003 and the yield gap 
between them did not grow to a considerable extent until the beginning of 2005, the reducing effect of 
the required reserve ratio policy on monetary oversupply remained ineffective in the first few years of 
the increase due to the rearrangement charged on the excess reserves. After recognizing it, the interest 
level of excess reserves was reduced, which led to reduction in the excess reserves.38 Since November 
2008, the central bank has paid an interest of 1.62% on required reserve deposits and 0.72% on excess 
reserves. Given that the central bank does not publish the breakdown of required and excess reserves, 
it is not possible to define the exact costs of the required reserve ratio policy. To deal with this 
problem, we determined a higher and a lower cost level, which presume the two extreme cases when 
the total central bank deposits consist of required or excess reserves. The interest paid on reserves is 
somewhere between the two values.39 In the analysis on the cost of reserves, we relied on the data 
about the deposits of the deposit collecting financial institutions of the central bank balance sheet and 
the interest levels paid on required and excess reserves published by the PBC. 
The assumed higher and lower level of the total sterilization costs of the monetary authority equal the 
sum of the interest payment received in the previous two methods (Figure 5). 
4.2. The income of foreign investments 
The cost of sterilization can be reduced by the income earned on foreign exchange investment. The 
quantification of this capital income is a great challenge, since the Chinese authorities does not publish 
the data regarding the composition of foreign exchange reserves. According to the literature, the 
foreign exchange reserves consist of mostly USD-, euro- and yen-based assets. The opinions agree 
unanimously that the decisive part of the reserves is denominated in USD. However, there is no 
consensus about the proportion of USD assets within the total assets. Scissors (2011) claims that this 
number is approximately between 58 % and 72%. With regard to China’s decisively USD-based 
reserve policy, our analysis started out from that the entire foreign exchange assets are based on USD. 
The database of the U.S. Treasury helped us to choose the proper asset, where the data regarding the 
American government bonds kept by foreigners is updated on a monthly basis. It showed that China 
hold the 36.6% of the American government debt possessed by the overseas countries, numerically 
1154 billion USD at the end of January 2011.40 Taking account of the stock of 2847 billion USD of the 
Chinese foreign exchange reserves in December 2010, the proportion of the American government 
                                                     
37
 In the first years of open market sterilization, the 1-year papers dominated in the CBB auctions, thus we used 
the yields of bonds of the same maturity to replace the CBB yields until September 2005. 
38
 Due to the interest level paid on the excess reserves, the average 4.5% excess reserves ratio in 2003 decreased 
to 1.9% by 2010. 
39
 It is assumed that the real interest burden converges towards the upper threshold of the sterilization costs 
because the ratio of the excess reserves to the required reserves has continuously decreased since the beginning 
of 2003. 
40
 However, the monthly data published in the system of the U.S. Treasury TIC is hardly realistic. In reality, the 
value of the American government bonds owned by China is considerably higher than 1154 billion USD. These 
data series do not contain the stock of approximately 250 billion USD, obtained through other intermediary 
countries. Furthermore, a stock of approximately 300 billion USD is also left out from this research, which was 
owned by China in two federal institutions of the American mortgage finance, in the Fannie Mae and the Freddie 
Mac in December 2010. Finally, a short-term debt and stock investment of 126 billion USD has also been left 
out of consideration. These shortcomings are supplemented by the U.S. Treasury in the annual TIC report. 
Accordingly, the value of the American assets possessed by the Chinese is estimated at 1611 billion USD on 30 
June 2010. 
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bonds within the total exchange rate reserves can be estimated to 40% at the end of 2010. If we also 
take account of the government bond purchase completed through other countries and the stock 
possessed by other American federal institutions, this ratio increases to approximately 60%.41 
Within the total American investments of China, the proportion of the short-term investment has been 
only an average of 8% in the past 8 years. Taking this observation as a starting point, we assume that 
the maturity composition of the central bank’s foreign portfolio shows a similar tendency as in the case 
of the total USD assets possessed by the Chinese. Therefore, our examination started out from the 5- 
and 10-year American government bond yields. The yields were converted to domestic currency on the 
average monthly yuan-USD exchange rate, thus the incomes became comparable with the costs of 
sterilization. In addition, we assumed that the PBC does not capitalize the interest incomes, but it 
spends them on covering the sterilization costs. Taking all this into consideration, the average annual 
yield earned on the foreign exchange reserves was 3.32% for the 5-year and 4% for the 10-year 
government bond between April 2003 and December 2010. 
Figure 5 shows the estimated monthly income of the PBC foreign exchange reserves and the tendency 
of the monetary sterilization costs between April 2003 and June 2011. Thanks to the exponentially 
increasing reserves and the – until the autumn of 2008 – increasing USD yield levels, it can be seen 
that the incomes covered the upper threshold value of the sterilization cost during almost the entire 
period. 
Figure 5: The tendency of sterilization costs and yield earned on foreign exchange reserves, 
2003-2011, billion yuan 
 
Source: CEIC (2011), US. Treasury, Bloomberg LP 
Note: In the case of the sterilization costs, the data of the first six months of 2011 are estimated values. 
We assumed that through the increase of interests paid on CBB bonds the costs of sterilization bonds 
increases with 33% annually, to the same extent as the average of the increase of 2010. By the 
constancy of the interests paid on required and excess central bank deposits, we prognosticated an 
average annual increase of 29% for the central bank deposits, observed during the entire period. 
Figure 5 shows the growth of the gap between incomes and costs until autumn 2007. After this, as a 
result of the money market tensions caused by the American sub-prime crisis, the FED started an 
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 Source: US Treasury TIC, The People Bank’s of China 
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aggressive monetary easing from the second half of 2007, which induced the decline in market yields. 
The effect of the globally decreasing yield levels spread in China in the last quarter of 2008, as a 
consequence of which the costs of sterilization reduced. With the escalation of the European sovereign 
debt problems, however, in the second half of 2010 and from June 2011 the profitability of foreign 
exchange-accumulation continues to decrease, which manifests itself in that the incomes estimated for 
the 5-year yields do not entirely cover the estimated upper threshold of the sterilization costs. It is 
further refined by the accelerating increase of the consumer price index experienced in the last year, in 
the light of which the further rise of the required reserve ratio is expected.42 
According to our prognosis43 developed on the tendency of the expected incomes and costs – until 
December 2014 – after June 2010 the upper bound of the sterilization costs exceeds the lower margin 
of the income earned on foreign assets to an increasing extent – by more than 40% by the end of 2014. 
However, the upper income level provides a proper amount of cover for the sterilization costs as time 
progresses. 
We also examined a case when the majority of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves would be put in 
one- and two-year American government bonds. In such a scenario, the average yield ratio would be 
2.4% and 2.6% during the entire period, as a result of which the incomes would not cover the lower 
bound of the sterilization costs already after March 2008. 
In the analysis of costs, we cannot leave the fact out of consideration that China was compelled to 
book considerable losses on its American asset backed securities during the crisis, which certainly 
further increases the sterilization cost we outlined. 
Assuming the exchange rate and the bond market yields at the end of 2010 to be constant in the future, 
the 41% decrease in foreign exchange reserves would be needed in order that the lower margin of the 
incomes touch the lower margin of the sterilization costs. Such a scenario, however, can hardly be 
imagined in the near future due to the current priorities of the exchange rate and trade policy. 
In the analysis of monetary sterilization, we have so far quantified merely the direct costs of the 
measures narrowing the money supply. We have not taken account of the indirect costs which can be 
originated from the effects of sterilization policy that divert the money and real market balance. So for 
example the harmful effects of excess capacities caused by the undervalued yuan, the costs of high 
reserve ratio charged to the private sector, the extent of exchange rate loss due to revaluation44, and the 
lower domestic demand caused by increasing foreign exchange reserves (Gábor, 2010c). 
Apart from the indirect costs, we think the delusions that the monetary sterilization created 
unsustainable processes in the Chinese economy do not hold. At least it certainly does not hold 
according to the cost-benefit principle proper, since the capital income of the continually increasing 
foreign exchange assets has provided more than sufficient cover for covering the costs of monetary 
sterilization in the past decade. 
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 The required reserve rate has been raised by the central bank twelve times, with 650 base points to 21.5% 
since 2010. According to market analysts, with a rise of 50 base points, a money supply of approximately 350-
400 billion yuan can be withdrawn from the market. 
43
 During the extrapolation of the incomes, we regarded the American government bond yields of June 2011 to 
be constant, assuming the annual 32% increase in the foreign exchange reserves. In the case of the sterilization 
costs, we prognosticated an annual increase of 33% for the CBB costs, while 29% for central bank deposits. We 
regarded the yields paid on the central bank’s required and the excess deposits to be constant. 
44
 Although the exchange rate loss is not an explicit expenditure for the central bank, its extent cannot be 
neglected. In the two revaluation periods (2005-2008 and 2010-), the central bank had to book an exchange rate 
loss of approximately 2935 billion yuan. 
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5. The sustainability of the process of the regular foreign exchange 
intervention 
In our research, we aimed to find out how efficiently the sterilization measures for maintaining the 
managed exchange rate regime neutralized the liquidity increasing effect of the foreign exchange-
inflow and how much costs this economic policy practice imposed on the monetary authority. As the 
result of the 2SLS regression we carried out, we could observe that the central bank was able to 
neutralize the increase of the money oversupply with an almost total success on the level of the 
monetary base, while with half success on the level of the M2 supply. In the knowledge of today’s 
accelerating inflation and the limits of sterilization, however, it is questionable whether the monetary 
policy will be able to stem the increase of the price level, one of the most frequent causes of social 
tensions, in the long term while maintaining the current exchange rate regime. 
In the light of this, the question raised by many people on how a country which has an increasingly 
open economy and strives for great power status and – perhaps – key currency position will be able to 
maintain its strictly managed exchange rate system in a way that it meanwhile leaves increasing room 
for foreign capital and it remains financially open. The current stabilization-sterilization practice does 
not seem to be an unsustainable process, if we take account of only the explicit costs of the 
sterilization policy. However, if we also take the direct, social political costs into consideration, we get 
a completely different picture. Consequently, there is a need for the types of research which set the aim 
of the quantification of implicit costs in order to provide a more exact answer to the question on the 
sustainability of the Chinese sterilization. 
6. China as the new financer of the European Union 
The economic crisis of the 21st century has caused sharp changes in the geopolitical filed of the world. 
The greatest “beneficiary” of these changes and, at the same time, the unequivocal winner of the crisis 
has been the People’s Republic of China. It is an unquestionable fact that due to the increasing weight 
of China, Beijing is gaining an increasing momentum in developing the frameworks of the global 
order. With the growth in the world political, global security and world economic position of the first 
great power of the Asia-Pacific region, it has an increasing effect on the international order. 
In addition to gaining position during the crisis, the increasing world market role of the economy that 
has a huge internal market and record high foreign exchange reserves has done an undeniably great 
service to attenuate the hard-landing of the world economy and to mitigate recession. China’s import 
demand, which has a significant volume also in global context, and increasing foreign direct 
investments were considerably revalued during the crisis. Despite the fact that before the occurrence of 
the crisis China was the greatest trading partner of the United States and the United States was that of 
China, and the largest trade flow was transacted between China and the USA, considerable changes 
occurred in terms of both trade and capital flows in the course of the crisis. The European Union was 
perhaps one of the greatest “beneficiaries” of these changes. 
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The revaluation of the European economic region for the Chinese can also be explained by that 
China’s relationship with the European Union has been much less characterized by tensions than what 
we could observe in the American-Chinese cooperation.45 
The first official trade agreement of China and the European Community was signed in 1985. 
Although the economic and political relation system of the two countries has been far from cloudless 
for the past more than two and half decades, the Union has all the while tried to take a tone towards 
China which is “softer” and more ready for compromise compared to the overly one-sided and strict 
American tone. However, the acceleration of the trade relationships can also be explained by that 
different competencies have come under the powers of the member states and that of Brussels. While 
the responsibility of the formers is the development of trade and economic relationships, the latter is 
responsible for managing the problematic areas such as human rights or the protection of the 
intellectual property right. The economic cooperation of the two countries speeded up by China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 and the creation of the strategic partnership in 2003. Although after this, 
and partly because of the EU accession of the new member states, the dynamics of the trade relations 
of the EU27 and China continuously increased, these processes accelerated even more significantly 
during the crisis. 
China’s interest is the stability of the economy of the Eurozone and the European Union. This must be 
examined in two aspects; in terms of trade on the one hand, and in terms of investments on the other. 
The literature uniformly considers that nearly one fourth of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves of 
3200 billion USD – approximately 700-800 million USD – is invested in euro assets (Scissors, 2011). 
The unsuccessful management of the European sovereign debt problem projects the decline of the 
European single currency and – in the most pessimistic case – the potential future disintegration of the 
European Monetary Union. In such a case, as a consequence of the negative wealth effect China would 
have considerable losses due to its European investments. 
According to European estimations, China owned more than 7 per cent of the Eurozone’s total debts in 
2011, which tendency has continuously increased in the past period as well. Many claim that Ireland 
may soon be the next after Greece, Portugal and Spain (Szunomár, 2011). In 2011, the Asian giant 
appeared as a purchaser also in the state debt market of our country – in the market of both the forint 
based and the foreign exchange based bonds – as a consequence of which China had possessed 
Hungarian government bonds in the order of about hundred million euros by the summer of 2011 
based on the data of the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) (Portfólió, 2011; Index, 2011). 
According to the latest news, Beijing also considers purchasing bonds issued by the European 
Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF), which provides the Union’s financial support of the member 
states having serious financial problems. 
In addition to that China gives help to the European states that struggle with troubles and external 
financing difficulties, it gains significant extra yields compared to the American government bond 
investments. Let alone it can reduce to an extent the tension originating from the “dollar trap” through 
the diversification of the foreign exchange reserves. 
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 Similarly to the EU, the United States continues to refuse China’s market economic status, with the difference 
that the USA classifies China among the “non-market” state regulated economies – while the EU regards China 
as a transition economy. It means that the USA may adopt (and it does adopt) considerably stricter anti-dumping 
measures against the Chinese products than the EU – which is counted as very discriminative in the judgment of 
the Chinese. In addition, the States has kept Beijing under serious diplomatic pressure for almost a year due to 
the undervalued dollar exchange rate of the yuan. 
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However, it must not be forgotten that the European “spreading” of the Chinese foreign direct- and 
portfolio capital is not a good will and presumably not only business. 
Increasing the European influence serves the growing great power interest of China. As the new 
financer and significant investor of Europe it thus moves in quite a good direction in these terms. 
Today European leaders queue up to China to share somehow in the gigantic foreign exchange 
reserves of the “Asian lion” – and they do it in a way that avoids the earlier conventional talks and 
instructs on human rights. 
It seems that China gradually manages to soften the earlier solid opinion of Brussels in such delicate 
questions as the case of the “undervalued yuan”, the concerns over human rights and the question of 
the weapons embargo to China effective since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. 
The cautious and “the small steps policy” type of attitude characterizing Beijing’s foreign policy 
seems to come up to the expectations. The second part of the president of the republic Hu Jintao’s 
reputed statement that “China’s development is unimaginable without the world and the world’s 
development also needs China” is becoming increasingly evident today. 
Furthermore, the Chinese foreign exchange reserves which support several European states and 
finance European great investments (e.g. Polish motorway tender, construction of Italian and Greek 
sea- and Italian airport, etc.), in addition to increasing Beijing’s European economic and political 
influence and returning considerable profit, they decrease the one-sided dependence of China on the 
USA, strengthen the euro and indirectly the multipolar world view in which the European Union is 
similarly interested as China. 
Although the amount of the Chinese direct investment present in Europe – compared to other regions, 
e.g. the United States – can be regarded small today (in 2010 investment with a total value of 
altogether 6.7 billion euro), it has been growing increasingly dynamically in the past years – in 2010 
by 17.5% compared to the previous year!) 
Contrary to the foreign exchange movements related to capital flow, the intensification of the 
relationship of China and the EU27 is even more visible in the field of trade. China could raise its 
participation in terms of both the Union’s export and import before and during the crisis as well. 
According to the Eurostat data, between 2008 and 2010 China’s participation in the total Union export 
increased from 6 to 8.4 per cent, while it increased from 15.8 to 18.7 per cent in the case of import. 
During the years of the crisis, due to the even more intensive trade relationship between the two 
economies, the EU became the largest trading partner of China in 2010 China, while China became the 
most significant trading partner of the Union by the summer of 2011 (in both cases pushing the USA 
back to the second place). While in 2010 they transacted a trade of record high 395 billion euros, more 
by 100 billion euros than the previous year, in the first three quarters of 2011 the extent of trade 
already exceeded the 80% of the year 2010! Furthermore, it can also be stated that despite the fact that 
the EU’s Chinese import demand significantly dropped back (by ~40 billion euros) in 200946, a trade 
balance deficit emerged again between the two countries in 2010 that reached the extent of the 2007-
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 The decline can be explained by a dual cause. On the one hand, in the year mainly involved in the crisis and 
the real economic shrinkage, in 2009, the Union’s internal demand extremely dropped back, which apparently 
has a significant effect on the EU’s foreign trade, particularly on the import (Figure 1). On the other hand, the 
considerable decline of the euro compared to the USD, sometimes reaching 20% (compared to 2008), also 
caused the decrease in import. The euro thus considerably declined compared also to the Chinese currency fixed 
to de facto dollar, which made the Chinese import products more expensive through the exchange rate effect. 
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2008 (Figure 1) – which to some degree shadows the EU-China economic relations (similarly to the 
case of the USA and China). 
Figure 6: EU’s Trade Balance with China and the year-on-year change of its export and import, 
million euro 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
Despite the exchange rate of the yuan that is considered undervalued, Europe’s export towards China 
has been able to dynamically increase in the past two years, which has significantly facilitated the 
mitigation of recession of the European countries arranged to export. In the most serious year of the 
crisis, in 2009, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus (and also our country by 
17%) could increase its export towards China by more than 20% compared to the previous year 
(Inotai, 2011).47 It must be emphasized because these countries that are relatively small and have quite 
an open economy – and they are exposed to the changes of the international demand – were unable 
(more exactly were not allowed) to stimulate the national demand with such gigantic Keynes-type 
government spending (fiscal expansion) as for example Germany or France did in 2009-2010 given 
the rising government debt path. Therefore, the declining domestic consumption could be to some 
extent compensated with the increase in export in addition to the moderate increase of fiscal 
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 And decrease exceeding 10% was registered in the case of only three countries (Slovenia, Luxemburg and 
France)! 
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expenditure. It was further helped by the devaluation of the euro and of the national currencies of the 
non-eurozone member states to the USD (and quasi the yuan). 
The economic interdependence and trade symbiosis of China and America (“Chinamerica”) by today 
has become a cooperation full of tensions that has made necessary for China to open towards other 
regions. The “Asian lion” gaining headway and influence, in addition to being a prospering business 
for China, decreases dollar-dependency, fosters building a multipolar world order, in which the 
European Union is also interested, and softens the opinion of Brussels in the issues that earlier caused 
tensions. 
In the light of the economic relationships of the past years, it can be expected that the trade and 
investment relationships between the EU and China continues to flourish. Given that China’s 12th 
five-year plan puts a great emphasis on intensifying internal consumption and decreasing export 
dependency, it can be expected that the trade disproportion developed between the two countries will 
be reduced and the European export will increase exceeding the import in the middle term. 
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